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Abstract  
 This essay examines possibilities for a reflexive understanding of 
knowledge attainment that is grounded in the enactive capacities of living 
systems.  Appreciating the enactivist agenda requires a dislodging of 
obstructions created by an accumulated history of transcendental abstractions 
that have sought to provide a Cartesian “unmovable point” against which 
knowledge claims are veridically judged. This essay traces some long-held 
philosophical and scientific assumptions that have limited the attainment of 
knowledge in exchange for the banishment of epistemic anxieties that result 
from a loss of absolute certainty. A brief history of this problem is presented 
as context for the present advocacy of an enactive approach to the pursuit of 
cognitive outcomes.  It is hoped that enactivism may offer a stable, yet 
evolving, understanding of how data, information, and knowledge intersect 
to constitute living and learning.  Implications, both moral and scientific, are 
shared. 
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Introduction 
 Enactivism (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Clark, 2008; 
Thompson, 2010, 2017) and its older close cousin, embodied cognition, 
comprise a collection of philosophical and scientific developments that 
challenge the paradigmatic underpinnings of thought systems and 
methodologies derived from Platonism and its Neo-Platonic and Christian 
variations in philosophy, science, and the humanities.  Though recently 
emerged as a systematic body of theory and practice, enactivism owes much 
to the 18th Century Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico, who challenged 
the new Cartesian hegemony in ascendance at the time of Descartes’s death 
in 1650.  Enactivism offers an immanent alternative to the primacy of 
absolutist dogma in its many guises, whether religious or scientific.  
Enactivism seeks to comprehend and interpret the nature and relations of 
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being and knowledge without various and persistent transcendental 
abstractions or materialistic reductions. It aims to offer a compelling 
alternative to the widely accepted view that knowledge is derived from a pre-
given world, which is accurately reproduced as internal representations 
within individual minds and/or bodies. Enactivism challenges the veracity, 
nay existence, of any such representations that rely upon reception of data, 
whether impressed through the senses or revealed or uncovered by ideational 
processes, which are acted upon, reflected upon, or are, otherwise, stored and 
retrieved for some later purpose. 
 
I. 
Every reaction against Platonism is a restoration of immanence in its 
full extension and its purity, which forbids the return of any 
transcendence.  –Gilles Deleuze 
 The various manifestations within enactivism share a central 
skepticism toward prevailing certainties of either rationalists or empiricists 
that remain largely unshaken by generations of intellectual challenges, from 
Hobbes to Gassendi and from Vico to Nietzsche and from Foucault to 
Deleuze.  Both Hobbes and Gassendi offered an alternative to Cartesian 
rationalism, notably focusing on the role of the sensually grounded 
imagination as an “absolutely indispensable step between sensual perception 
and more abstract cognitive faculties and was in this capacity a necessary 
means of understanding” (Ricken, 1994, p. 18). If Descartes’ theory of 
transcendental abstraction is to be replaced by a science and philosophy of 
“pure immanence,” as Deleuze (2001) would have it, it will be due 
significantly to Vico’s early challenges to Descartes’ scientism, his disdain 
for the humanities, and the Cartesian argument for innate ideas, which Vico 
dismissed with principle, verum ipsum factum (the truth is the made). In the 
translator’s introduction to On the Study Methods of Our Time, Gianturco 
points out that Vico’s opposition was not leveled so much at Descartes and 
the scientific spirit as it was against the “degeneration and dogmatizations of 
Cartesianism, as exemplified by Malebrancehe, Lamy, Arnauld, etc” (Vico, 
1990).  Gianturco quotes Maria Goretti (Lemonnier, 1958) from her 
introduction to Vico’s De nostri: “. . . Vico . . . appear to us, not so much the 
adversary of the Cartesian spirit, as, rather, the enemy of the intellectualistic 
schema: a schema which forces tumultuous, contradictory human nature into 
the straightjacket of an absolute truth, of a truth excogitated, dreamt of, but 
never to be actually met with in reality.”  
 The Platonic and Cartesian dominance of the philosophy of mind and 
knowledge has continued, nonetheless, despite many challenges since the 
18th Century.  Michael Peters (2004) points out that those writing in the 
critical tradition that Nietzsche inspired toward Cartesian dislodgement have 
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not so much dislodged Platonism and its many variants as they have more 
often inverted it, thus making way for a body-based credo that often defines 
itself by rejecting what it is not.  Such either-or arguments for an alternative 
embodiment, Peters suggests, attempt to roust the mind to make room for the 
domination of the body, rather than healing the Cartesian rupture between 
mind and body, subject and object, self and other. Merleau-Ponty’s 
embodied phenomenology, for instance, offers a profound and detailed 
alternative to Cartesianism, and yet Foucault saw phenomenology’s 
embodied search for meaning and affirmation as an inverted Platonism, 
whereby the body becomes inscribed with the same relations of power that 
were previously deployed to establish control by mind. 
 It will take an expanded conception embodiment to loosen the pull of 
the Cartesian gravity that has drawn theoretical and applied disciplines 
toward a conception of knowledge as disembodied abstraction, wherein the 
learning self is viewed as a fixed, abstract quantity engaged in mental 
gymnastics based on reductive analysis, memory work, and self-control. 
Historically, this cognitive training regimen has relegated the physical, 
purposeful, and emotional aspects of personhood to the level of annoying 
distractions that require the further exercise of mental discipline to keep 
them properly contained by the intellect.  As with so many of our 
philosophical traditions and intellectual fixities, this conception of 
knowledge can be traced to Plato, who located the epistemological Holy 
Grail beyond mutability, physicality, or even time, itself.  Plato placed the 
fundamental laws that govern our universe within the reach of mathematical 
thinking, which offered an independence from the mutable world that earned 
it the closest proximity to eternal and unchanging verities for which the gods 
only had full access, and toward which humanity must concentrate its 
intellectual efforts to attain approximations.  The light of Truth, thus hidden 
from human experience, requires the exercise of reason and intuition to 
locate its remaining glimmers.  The sensate aspects of living in the world of 
change are, thus, relegated to that metaphysical ghetto, wherein the 
imagination and the expressive arts may, to some extent, purge the unruly 
passions. 
 Neo-Platonism, then, came to have a prominent presence in the 
molding of early Christian thought and in the shaping of Augustine’s 
theological views in the further separation of soul and mind and body, views 
that were fueled, too, by religious dogma regarding the carnal origin of 
human sin.  By the time we get to Descartes twelve hundred years later, the 
disembodiment of knowledge and goodness is quite complete, the physical 
only surviving as motion and extension (and thus quantifiable), and the 
human body hanging on as an automaton directed by the mind and tenuously 
connected at the pineal gland. 
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 Following the conviction of Galileo by the Inquisition, Descartes was 
most interested in ingratiating the Jesuits who controlled the Sorbonne and, 
thus, the center of learning.  And so it was that Descartes found a prominent 
place for God in his, otherwise, secular science;  his philosophical system 
would be guaranteed by God’s ultimate goodness and rational purpose.  
Weaving his way through a theological minefield that could explode at any 
misstep (Schmaltz, 1999, p. 39), Descartes appropriated for his thought 
system an omnipotent and omniscient deity as a basis for what, otherwise, 
may have been viewed as a doubtable world of bodies and other mutable 
objects. In short, the casting of a mind-body dualism, with God as bridge 
between the two, offered Descartes a way to fully pursue secular certainty, 
while handing to God the credit that the Church demanded.  Cartesianism, 
then, provided a way to fully pursue the enlightened subjectivity of human 
reason through science, while offering to God the ultimate veridical authority 
for the conclusions of human reason, which, in turn, were used to logically 
demonstrate the existence of the same God who could be counted on, in 
circular fashion, to substantiate the veracity of the argument. 
 For Descartes and all who inherited his method, God provided the 
bridge that reliably connected the subjective indubitability of analytical and 
reductive thought that were represented in the mathematically decipherable 
puzzles of the physical world.  As modern science gained confidence and 
drew away from the acceptance of Descartes’ theological guarantee for 
subjective certainty, one might say the reduction took over as the individual 
subjective truth yielded to a higher need to extract the subjectivity for which 
God could no longer vouch in the methodologies of science.  In the process, 
the preeminince of the modern individual of the Enlightenment that 
Descartes helped to create began to vanish. The scientific reductionism that 
resulted left science with a detached perspective that Nagel (1989) referred 
to as “a view from nowhere.”  And as Bourgine and Varela (1992) would 
pithily note in regards to the advance of reductionism, “the Cartesian 
commitment to reduction that was meant to justify the replacement of the 
collective by the individual as the locus of actions annihilates the individual 
on its march toward the quark” (p. xvi).   
 By the end of the 19th Century, Descartes’ conception of mind had 
become a ghostly apparition on its way to being banished entirely by a new 
scientific psychology of timed human reflexes and conditioned behaviors. 
And despite reservations by John Dewey, William James, and others 
regarding the behaviorists’ abstracting of human experience on the one hand 
and the objectifying of human purpose on the other, the new physical 
psychology brushed aside their protests as arcane residues of philosophical 
thinking, which had no place in the new experimental psychology, 
specifically, or the new social sciences, generally.   
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 When the mind finally reappeared on the scientific stage, it was 
largely due to an interdisciplinary confederation of geniuses and luminaries 
that assembled in New York for the first Macy Conference in 1946, with the 
immodest goal of creating a new interdisciplinary scientific study of control 
mechanisms and communication in biological and physical systems (Conway 
and Siegelman, 2005). Core members included Ross Ashby (psychiatrist), 
Gregory Bateson (anthropologist), Julian Bigelow (electro technician), Heinz 
von Foerster (biophysicist), Lawrence K. Frank  (social scientist), Ralph W. 
Gerard (neurophysiologist), Molly Harrower (psychologist), Lawrence Kubie 
(psychiatrist), Paul Lazarsfeld (sociologist), Kurt Lewin (psychologist), 
Warren McCulloch (chair) (psychiatrist), Margaret Mead (anthropologist), 
John von Neumann (mathematician), Walter Pitts (mathematician), Arturo 
Rosenblueth (physiologist), Leonard J. Savage (mathematician), and Norbert 
Wiener (mathematician). 
 Given the name cybernetics by Norbert Weiner, the new scientific 
search for endogenous control mechanisms and information patterns quickly 
exposed basic differences among the participants of the Macy Conferences, 
which were convened 10 times between 1946 and 1952. There were those 
who supported a hard science research agenda and those who advocated a 
research programme inspired more by the biological and social sciences. 
Whereas the former focused on a mathematical approach to the modeling of 
mind based on data processing, transfer, storage, and manipulation, the latter 
sought an analog model of cognition aimed at understanding the processes of 
control, communication, and information in living systems. Consistent with 
the earlier development of social science in the U. S., a hard science 
approach dominated the emergence of the new science during in 1950s, 
which came to be known as cognitive science. 
 Unable as they were to unlock the actual workings of the brain, the 
new cognitive scientists used the architecture of the early modern computer 
as an opportunity to model the thought process and problem solving 
processes that would undergird a new rigorous science of mind.  However, it 
did not take long for some deep-seated problems to emerge.  Intended to 
model the operations of the human mind, the new computer design 
embedded the limitations of long-held rationalist assumptions into what 
came to be known as the von Neumann architecture.  These philosophical 
assumptions, however, remained quite invisible to the architects themselves 
until the problems they set in motion could no longer be ignored.   
 Early computer design was based on the Cartesian model of mind as 
a sequential, logical calculator that manipulates a rules-based symbolic 
language whose correlates represent aspects of the pre-given world.  The 
computer is charged with solving problems posed to it in its rules-based 
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language of if-then statements by sifting through a stored repertoire of data 
that may be retrieved and configured to represent a solution.  
 Two problems quickly became apparent: Any disordering in the 
smallest local element of the coded language caused major malfunction in 
the whole system, and the sequential processing of data created a bottleneck 
when the system encountered large amounts of data to process, store, and 
retrieve.  The new digital model of mind, then, was quite incapable of feats 
achieved by simplest beings found in the living world: 
. . . the most ordinary visual tasks, done even by tiny insects, are done 
faster than is physically possible when simulated in a sequential 
manner; the resiliency of the brain to damage without compromising 
all of its competence, has been known to neurobiologists for a long 
time (Varela, 1992).  
In short, cognitive scientists discovered that the central processor computer 
model of mind/brain, which required vast sequentially accessed programs to 
accomplish the simplest of tasks, did not resemble at all the way the living 
things in the experiential world operate.  
 Over the years, these unresolved problems inspired the next 
generations of cognitive scientists who included, ironically perhaps, the 
theoretical descendents of the losing faction from the original Macy 
Conferences, those who looked to the life sciences and social social world to 
inspire and inform cognitive modeling. Representing mathematics, 
neuroscience, biology, technology, philosophy, economics, and linguistics, 
the more recent iteration of interdisciplinary cognitive science pursues an 
agenda aimed at modeling and understanding the self-organizing, distributed, 
and emergent behavior of natural living systems based on simple interaction 
rules and without central control units.  
 So it is with no small dose of irony that cognitive science, which was 
responsible for the simplistic and incorrect metaphor of the brain as an 
information processing device, is at the forefront of efforts by 
neurophenomenologists (Rudrauf, et al, 2003) to model thought processes as 
enfolded and unfolding, distributed, and self-organizing emergent 
phenomena that operate beyond any pre-established repertoire of strategies. 
As a further irony, recent developments in modeling of computer-based 
artificial intelligence and artificial life are based on biological and social 
models with self-organizing principles. 
 At the cutting edge of cognitive science, then, is the realization that 
any life-based system maintains autonomy, embodies change (learns), and 
enacts logics derived from its own history of intra-actions of its components 
while interactively coupled with the larger environment (Barandiaran, 2017):  
Autonomy emphasizes the self-organized, holistic, dynamic 
interdependence within self-sustaining organizations, it challenges 
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representationalist realism as a way to approach agent-environment 
relationships by highlighting the dialectic codependence between the 
identity of a system and the habitat it selects, shapes and brings about 
through its specific mode of coupling (p. 427). 
Because the conceptual basis of enactivism enshrines a relational 
epistemology that extends beyond individual minds or bodies to enfold and 
unfold an ecology of interactions by all that is living, these insights embody 
an ethic of being that will be crucial to sustaining a shared world of 
mutuality for both individual and collective. 
 In the remainder of this essay, I will share some of the basic 
assumptions and concepts that are foundational to enactivism (Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007), and I will offer some 
suggestions as to how this “naturalized epistemology” (Varela, 1979) may 
offer tools for a more productive and sustainable future of life on Earth. 
 Even though science in many respects has moved beyond the 
limitations imposed by Descartes’ method, there remains with us a 
psychological frailty as old as our philosophical schemes to assure 
objectivity and to locate an invariant Archimedean point from which to 
operate. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) refer to this problem as a  
arising from a “Cartesian anxiety,” one that 
. . . is best put as a dilemma: either we have a fixed and stable foundation 
for knowledge, a point where knowledge starts, is grounded, and rests, or 
we cannot escape some sort of darkness, chaos, and confusion.  Either 
there is an absolute ground or foundation, or everything falls apart (p. 
141). 
 However, Varela (1979) has pointed out that there is no independent 
access from which “to stand outside our own experience . . . and see 
ourselves as a unit in an environment” (p. 274).  Epistemological schemes 
that ignore this limitation make it possible to avoid the Cartesian anxiety, but 
at the cost of bowing to the Janus-faced idol of absolute objectivity or 
absolute subjectivity. Either remedy, however, offers a false Archimedean 
point for cognition that is based on a cut “between the cognizing subject and 
the object to be known.” (Varela, Principles of Biological Autonomy, 275)  
 This bifurcation has the undesirable effect of isolating human 
knowers from the worlds they would know, which, in effect, sets human 
experience against that which is essential to defining itself.  Besides putting 
humans at odds with the ecologies for which they depend upon to be 
properly constituted, the capture or discovery of accurate representations 
depends upon the successful elimination of subjectivity and the freezing of 
experience into “controlled” conditions that supposedly represent the stable 
givenness of a world unadulterated by temporal and localized elements.  In 
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effect, Plato’s search for that which is immutable lives on in these failed 
efforts, as does Descartes’ search for the “unmovable point.”( 
 This objectivist conception sets into motion many faulty distinctions 
that follow from it.  In choosing an Archimedean vantage point or ultimate 
ground that we may label God, mind, cogito, body, or even DNA, we 
attribute certainty when, in fact, there is none that is not grounded by the 
“praxis of living as a primary experiential condition” (Maturana, 1988, 5.2). 
The fault lines beneath Cartesian “unmovable points” become visible as we 
consider that the ‘knower’ and the ‘to be known’ are components of a co-
determinative process for “effective action of a living being in its 
environment” (Maturana and Varela, 1998, p. 29).  
 When enactivism is, thus, conceived as “bringing forth a world” by 
autonomous intra-actions and interactions of individual actors, describers, 
knowers, learners (Horn and Wilburn, 2005) within an environmental 
medium that influences and is influenced by those interactions, the 
separation of out-there and in-here may be seen as an unneeded and 
misleading distinction for a process that is beyond our ability to know it 
without a human knower or to describe it without a human describer. 
 Enactive cognition could not occur without its bodily biological 
grounding that, at its most fundamental level, is constituted by cells (first-
order unity) that are autopoietic, i.e., self-organized by the interactions of 
cell components within a membrane that is sustained through those 
interactions.  These first-order cellular unities, then, comprise meta-cellular 
entities (second-order unities), whether ants, antelopes, or humans, which 
are, too, self-organizing.  The self-organizing, adaptive activities of second-
order unities are constituted by internal interactions that remain consistent 
with the limits and possibilities of environmental conditions.  These 
individuals interacting through language acts, whether ant pheremone trails 
or human speech acts, create and sustain the information-communication 
domain (third-order unities) that, too, are self-generating and self-sustaining 
within the boundary conditions established by the system members’ 
interactions coupled within the larger environment.   
 Within the organizational boundary that limits a self-organizing 
system to becoming and being itself, the structural components that operate 
within those boundaries are constantly engaged in intra-actions and 
interactions that maintain system identity, while initiating changes that are 
consistent with, though unspecified by, the larger environment.  The 
environment provides perturbations from which a fluid repertoire potential 
actions define possibilities for change, or learning, within self-organizing 
unities, whether first, second, or third order.   
 It is correct to say that continued actions of cells, organs, humans, or 
social systems are contingent upon each successive unity’s structural drift 
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within its environment, or “interaction domain” (Rudrauf, 2003, p. 34) to 
which it remains open, even though the specific actions of each unity is 
entirely structure-determined from within the organizational boundaries that 
define it.  The autonomy, then, at each level of first, second, and third order 
unities negates the possibility of a biological reductionism, even though each 
level is imbricated with the level of unity from which it emerges as a distinct 
entity. Each level of an organic system is inexticably linked to others, even 
as the actions and behaviors at each level cannot be predicted by the 
organization and structures at other levels.   
 The import of these distinctions for the effort to reclaim a unified 
enactive embodiment for knowledge attainment (learning) is far reaching. 
First and foremost, it becomes clear that all that we know of first-order and 
second-order unities comes to us from our status as third-order unities.  It is 
our languaged communications that provide  descriptive accounts of 
operations that are essentially beyond our capacity to access them in any 
more direct fashion than our describer status as languaging observers allows.  
Even so, there is a great deal to know from descriptions of our experience, 
even without direct access to the biology of cognition at first or second-level 
operations.    
 We know, too, that the sources of our conscious descriptions are 
partially derived from sources beyond our awareness of them.  Cognitive 
neuroscientists point out that conscious behavior that we normally refer to as 
“cognition” constitutes a small part of the enactive behaviors engaged in the 
bringing forth descriptions of our cognitive activities.  Furthermore, and 
perhaps more disturbing to those still in the throes of the Cartesian anxiety, 
the conscious part of cognition is comprised entirely of a continuing series of 
transiently correlated neuronal ensembles, or microworlds (Varela,  1999) 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), whose “transition 
between two distinct cognitive acts (such as face perception and motor 
response) should be punctuated by a transient undoing of the preceding 
synchrony and allowing for the emergence of a new ensemble. . .” 
(Rodriguez, 1999, p. 433).   
 Cognition, at its root, is a cellular behavior that begins with the boot-
strapping of in-formation that occurs within an organism and its domain of 
intra-actions and interactions within an environment.  In the enactive 
approach, information is defined in the “original etymological sense of in-
formare, to form within” (Varela, 1979, p. 266). But rather than an 
imprinting of a representation from the environment, the environment 
supplies perturbations that initiate indeterminate sensori-motor actions that 
are, in fact, distributed throughout the body and modulate registered 
perturbations all along the various pathways to and from the brain in a 
recursive fashion.  Furthermore, the registering of these perturbations is 
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influenced by the individual’s history of interactions within its environment 
that produce repertoires of distributed neuronal paths and configurations, or 
ensembles, that remain plastic.  It is the sensori-motor assembling at each 
moment that modulates inputs to register the distinctions that constitute 
observers’ in-formational acts: 
. . . the nervous system does not ‘pick up information’ from 
the environment, as we often hear.  On the contrary it brings 
forth a world by specifying what patterns of the environment 
are perturbations and what changes trigger them in the 
organism.  The popular metaphor of calling the brain an 
‘information processing device’ is not only ambiguous but 
patently wrong (Maturana and Varela, 1998, p. 166). 
The data field that comprises the surrounding environment becomes 
informative within the neurophysiology of the enacting agent that brings 
forth in-formation.  This circularity between knowing and acting reflects an 
ontological condition that is grounded in the making of distinctions, or the 
foregrounding of certain elements of the ecological context that become in-
formational and the backgrounding of others. 
 Cognition is always enactively embodied and dependent upon our 
status as observers, who are defined through our languaged communications 
as third-order unities and to which we attribute, individually, the identity of 
“I.” (Varela, 1999, pp. 60-2). The apparent permanency of our identity as an 
“I” is due to the communicative capacity to narrate and describe an ongoing 
series of temporal neuronal ensembles at the operational level that would, 
otherwise, remain beyond the narrative reach of “I.”  The persistence of our 
story over time enhances the verisimilitude for a stable “I” that, indeed, 
masks the complex inhibitory and excitatory dance (Varela, et al, 2001) 
among the distributed neuronal and hormonal communications emerging and 
disintegrating on an ongoing basis within our embodied second-order and 
first-order unities.  This stable “I,” then, is a virtual person at the center of a 
first-person narrative, one who provides the link from the corporeal body 
(the selfless “I”) to the larger social ecology comprised of other languaging 
humans.  According to Varela, then, the virtual “I” constructs a bridge that is 
“neither public nor private, but partakes of both.” (Varela, 1999, p. 62).   
This virtual self is, quite literally, the story of our both being and becoming, 
continuously refreshing or reloading itself like an updated web page at a 
dissolve rate that is entirely seamless. 
 Enactivism posits that cognition distinguishes itself as a story of the 
process that sustains it, which consists of a matrix of cognitive behaviors that 
are known to us only by our describing of them.  The descriptions of our 
experiences, which may include poems, paintings, essays, and petri dishes, 
are artifacts of experiencing, rather than objects that can be set outside of our 
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having experienced them. The artifacts that our experiencing supplies then 
provide the settings and furniture in the story that our “I” shares. 
 
Conclusion 
 The enactive approach reframes cognition in a way that may heal 
some of the misplaced cuts that our past search for truth has wielded: cuts 
between mind and body, subjectivity and objectivity, individual and 
environment, self and other.  Enactive cognition grounds knowledge in 
effective actions to “bring forth worlds” within dynamic environments that 
includes other humans and other life forms. This turn shifts away from the 
conceptualization of cognition from code breaking or problem solving within 
a repertoire of pre-given strategies, rules, individual virtues, or programs. 
 While re-inscribing the layered co-determinative unities of language, 
thought, and behavior that characterize the cognitive integrity of us human 
observers, the enactive approach locates humans within an ecological matrix 
that may achieve the ecological epistemology that is “not limited by the 
skin” (Bateson, 1972, p. 460). It moves us toward an epistemology of 
immanence that is no longer skull bound. The enactive turn may, perhaps, 
serve to animate a relational ethics that could produce a pragmatic side effect 
that benefits the planet’s, and thus our own, chances to survive with its 
biodiversity and cultural diversity intact.  Bateson (1972) spoke of resulting 
ontological modesty that could result from a repositioned epistemology:  
Freudian psychology expanded the concept of mind inwards to 
include the whole communication system within the body – the 
autonomic, the habitual, and the vast range of unconscious process. 
What I am saying expands mind outwards. And both of these changes 
reduce the scope of the conscious self. A certain humility becomes 
appropriate, tempered by the dignity or joy of being part of 
something much bigger (pp. 462-63). 
 When placed against a background of science conceived as a value-
free discovery of elements from a known unknown, enactivism makes figural 
our constructed knowledge of knowing and “the transparency of our actions” 
(Maturana and Varela, 1998, p. 249).  In so doing, we may hope that any 
remaining Cartesian anxiety that arises will not distract us further from 
accepting a moral accountability for the facts we value and the values that 
shape the facts to which we attend. Varela argued that “to the extent that we 
move from an abstract to a fully embodied view of knowledge, facts and 
values become inseparable. To know is to evaluate through our living, in a 
creative circularity” (emphasis in original) (Varela, 1992, p. 260).  The 
enactive approach to embodied cognition offers no Archimedean point from 
which to begin this project, but it may offer a modest emplacement from 
which to pivot and move forward.   
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